A word to define the Dallas Mavericks’ trade deadline? Urgency. The urgency to improve a roster mired in the Western Conference’s second tier. The urgency to remedy past personnel decisions. The urgency to add more athleticism and size to the roster. No team was as aggressive as the Dallas Mavericks were in executing deals of substantial value at the deadline. Outside of the Indiana Pacers’ trade for Pascal Siakam and the Los Angeles Clippers’ acquisition of James Harden, only two other teams in the NBA sacrificed a first round pick besides the Dallas Mavericks, who traded one and a pick swap for two players who will immediately enter their rotation.
Ever since the Mavericks traded Kristaps Porzingis, it feels like Nico Harrison has been playing a game of whack-a-mole in constructing the roster around Luka Doncic. When one need is seemingly solved for, another one pops up. The Porzingis deal unlocked three ball handler lineups (and subsequently, elite individual shot creation), but came at the expense of interior size and rim protection, a weakness the Golden State Warriors capitalized on in their Western Conference Finals victory. Last summer, the Mavericks were aggressive in trying to remedy that issue, trading a first round pick for Christian Wood and utilizing their taxpayer mid-level exception on JaVale McGee, while allowing Jalen Brunson to walk for nothing in free agency. Brunson’s departure exposed a void of on-ball playmaking, which led the Mavericks to trade Dorian Finney-Smith, Spencer Dinwiddie, and a 2029 unprotected 1st round pick for Kyrie Irving. Subsequently, trading Finney-Smith weakened a team already thin on perimeter defenders along the wing, an area addressed this summer through drafting Olivier Maxence-Prosper and executing a sign-and-trade for Grant Williams. As Harrison was under the hood fixing one leak, more and more appeared. Now that the dust has settled on this trade deadline, it feels like the Mavericks may have finally plugged all those leaks and won the game of whack-a-mole.
The Dallas Mavericks acquired center Daniel Gafford and forward PJ Washington at the deadline and, in return, sent out a lightly protected 2027 1st round pick (top-2 protected), a 2028 1st round pick swap (to OKC, in exchange for OKC’s 2024 first round pick which was subsequently routed to the Wizards for Gafford), Richaun Holmes, Grant Williams, and Seth Curry. Dallas also received two second round picks from Charlotte, which should be valuable currency in future deals (the Mavericks now own four total second round picks). As a result, the Mavericks became bigger, longer, more athletic, and significantly more versatile. I don’t think it’s a stretch that this may be the most talented roster in the Doncic-era in Dallas top to bottom. Not only that, but the relative youth of this bunch make it not only a lively (pun intended), exciting group, but one with perhaps some untapped potential. 50% of Dallas’ roster (sans two-way players) is 25 years old or younger, a remarkable turnaround from where the Mavericks were a year ago. In a vacuum, the overhaul executed by Nico Harrison has to be amongst the most impressive in the NBA. Dallas’ deliberately tanking and retaining what would be the 10th overall pick in last year’s draft set off a chain of events that ultimately have led to this: an ultra-versatile, young, athletic roster that boasts an impressive amount of depth.
In evaluating the acquisitions of Gafford and Washington, one thing should be noticeably apparent: both players offer great length (both have over 7’0 wingspans) athleticism, versatility, and multidimensionality, a stark contrast to players who have previously filled their roles. Considering how easy Doncic makes the game for others, it feels like the Mavericks have at times settled for “specialists”, or players who boast 1-2 above average (in theory) skills but have significant limitations across the holistic NBA skillset. A great example comes from their previous wings. Dorian Finney-Smith is a pure 3-and-D player; he’s not one to beat players off the dribble, initiate offense, or be a strong connective passer. Reggie Bullock was a similar mold, albeit nowhere near as good defensively and extremely hesitant to dribble the ball in halfcourt situations. Grant Williams ended up being similar as well, albeit his 3-PT shot disappeared and he struggled on both ends of the court. Personally, I’m most excited for the different flavor of style and layers that both Washington and Gafford have to their own individual games; it’s a new mix that hasn’t been in Dallas’ normal recipe.
Ironically, during my pre-trade deadline preview article, I wrote the following about PJ Washington:
I really like Washington, but you’d be hard pressed to find specific data points that would demonstrate his clear ability to move the needle forward for Dallas. I wouldn’t be trading a first round pick for Washington; if Charlotte was interested in a Grant Williams for Washington swap, I’d have some interest. Otherwise, I’d likely pass.
Naturally, Dallas sent both Grant Williams and a first round pick in the deal for Washington. My tune on this deal hasn’t changed necessarily, but I am excited to watch Washington play alongside Doncic, Kyrie Irving, and others in Dallas. There is a lot of exciting potential in his game; he’s a 6’7 forward with a 7’1 wingspan who moves well laterally, is a bouncy athlete, and has shown flashes of the versatility that teams fawn over. The problem? Washington has never been able to consistently put all his tools and skills together cohesively; in essence, he has become a player who can do a lot of things, but none of them at a level that moves the needle. Is Washington worth a first-round pick? As of his current play, I probably wouldn’t feel comfortable paying that price. However, I could quickly see a path where that price could end up being a steal.
In previous seasons, we’ve seen multiple players “reinvent” themselves on contending teams and ultimately, help win championships. Perhaps the first player to do this was Kyle Kuzma on the Los Angeles Lakers back in the bubble; previously, Kuzma was largely a volume scorer with middling defense (at best). During the title season, Kuzma transformed into a more reliable defender, capable third scoring option, and transition partner for LeBron James and Anthony Davis. Andrew Wiggins took a step with the Golden State Warriors just two years later, where he transformed from an inefficient, volume scorer with inconsistent defensive play to an efficient secondary scorer / shot creator who was a stout perimeter defender. Last season, Aaron Gordon took the leap, showing his versatility as a physical forward who could defend the opponents’ best offensive player, while thriving in transition and off cuts in Denver’s free flowing offense.
Ironically, I think all three of the aforementioned players (Kuzma, Wiggins, Gordon) bear some semblance to PJ Washington’s play and situation in Charlotte. Take a look at the comparison amongst all four players in their last full season prior to switching teams (or in the case of Kuzma, winning a title with the Lakers):
| USG% | PPG | eFG% | %FGM AST | DRB% | DLEBRON | |
| Kyle Kuzma (2018-19) | 22.2% | 12.8 | 51.6% | 70% | 12.3% | -0.07 |
| Andrew Wiggins (2018-19) | 23.7% | 18.1 | 46.3% | 54% | 10.1% | -0.95 |
| Aaron Gordon (2019-20) | 21.2% | 14.4 | 48.9% | 59% | 17.8% | 0.61 |
| PJ Washington (2022-23) | 18.9% | 15.7 | 52.1% | 80% | 13.0% | 0.27 |
Statistics don’t always match the eye test, but this is… interesting. PJ Washington lines up in fairly similar terms to players like Kuzma, Wiggins, and Gordon prior to reinvention with a new, winning team. The numbers during their title seasons show a stark improvement in production, particularly in terms of efficiency and defense:
| USG% | PPG | eFG% | %FGM AST | DRB% | DLEBRON | |
| Kyle Kuzma (2019-20) | 20.9% | 12.8 | 50.6% | 70% | 13.4% | 0.07 |
| Andrew Wiggins (2021-22) | 21.6% | 18.1 | 54.3% | 63% | 9.8% | 0.93 |
| Aaron Gordon (2022-23) | 20.1% | 14.4 | 60.7% | 65% | 12.9% | 0.71 |
The jumps by both Andrew Wiggins and Aaron Gordon are particularly notable; in a new system anchored around an all-offensive talent (Stephen Curry and Nikola Jokic), both players saw massive increases in efficiency and defensive productivity (albeit Gordon was already an elite defender). It’s easy to see the vision for what Dallas is hoping from PJ Washington; in a system alongside two elite offensive talents, Washington will get cleaner offensive looks and, similar to Wiggins and Gordon, witness an efficiency bump. As a result of a lesser shot creation burden and role adjustment, Washington could, in turn, fully maximize his defensive potential and turn into a reliable two-way player for the Mavericks. We’ve seen glimpses of Washington being able to switch on the perimeter, stay connected with guards or quicker wings, and contest shots. Tying his skillset together with a better-defined role is how he can take the Wiggins/Gordon “step” to being a legitimate 3rd / 4th option on a title team.
That being said, I still do have some concerns regarding the cost to acquire Washington. The ideal version of Washington that Dallas is hoping for is that complementary piece, but I worry he may still be a bit too limited. My biggest worry is that Washington is a player still reliant on others to create shots for him (80%+ of his made field goals have been assisted for his entire career). Despite having both Doncic and Irving, this is still a Mavericks’ roster that could use one more shot creator who can initiate some offense and space for others. Wiggins and Gordon, for example, both saw a bump in terms of assisted baskets, but still were capable of creating for themselves. It’s a skillset Washington hasn’t boasted with Charlotte; in essence, Washington’s efficiency boost that Dallas would come upon greater shot conversion, rather than Wiggins and Gordon who saw a boost more so of a result of reduced offensive creation burden. Washington can certainly get there, but his growth around occasional on-ball creation is an important factor to monitor in my opinion. It’s not as important as the step he’ll need to make defensively (which, in my opinion, will make or break this trade), but it is critical in determining Dallas’ ceiling.
When reviewing my own evaluation of Washington’s trade cost, I think I perhaps focused too much on Washington’s current production and ability in a fluctuating role on a bad Charlotte team and not enough on his potential growth with better role definition alongside a playoff team. I think there is merit in a debate around whether betting on the Wiggins/Gordon “step” for Washington is worth a first-round pick, but there is some evidence he can conceivably replicate the trajectory we saw from two other players that became key cogs on a roster that hoisted the Larry O’Brien Trophy. Theoretically, Washington can experience a similar step forward; if he does, this quite possibly could be a move that pushes Dallas into the elite tier in the NBA.
While the PJ Washington acquisition is one I’d classify more in the “upside” tier, adding Daniel Gafford is firmly in the “safety” tier. I think an underrated aspect of the joint moves for Washington and Gafford is not only do the players complement each other well, but their anticipated roles serve as a nice contrast. It’s an old Texas two-step if you will: Gafford serving as the backup center elevates Dallas’ regular season floor, while Washington filling the Andrew Wiggins / Aaron Gordon role capitalizes upon the better regular season production to propel the team to an NBA Finals championship.
The Washington trade is the one that generated more media buzz and hype, but I’m personally more excited about the Gafford acquisition. I’ve been adamant in the past about my belief that investing significant money / resources into a defensive-minded (or rim running) center isn’t a winning strategy. That isn’t to say avoid paying centers altogether, but the core skillset you need from the center position (namely, some combination of rim protection, defensive versatility, and rebounding) is rather abundant across the position. The amount of shooting present in the NBA has significantly diminished the postseason value of centers who cannot punish smaller players either in the post or on the offensive glass. These notes aren’t specific to Gafford, but rather my macro view on the position at large; it’s why usually, I’m not a fan of acquiring centers for first round picks.
However, one thing cannot be understated: having elite rim defense is highly correlated to a team’s regular season success. Statistics aside, it’s an intuitive concept; being above average at defending the most efficient shot (sans free throws) on the court should yield better overall defensive numbers. The data does back this up as well:
- Last season, 67% of teams (10/15) who were above average in rim defense made the postseason.
- This season, 67% of teams (10/15) who are above average in rim defense are top-8 in their respective conferences.
- In 2021-22, only 53% of teams (8/15) who were above average in rim defense made the postseason, although three above average teams (San Antonio, Cleveland, Los Angeles) lost in the play-in tournament (Cleveland and Los Angeles were top-8 seeds).
- In 2020-21, 53% of teams (8/15) who were above average in rim defense made the postseason, although two above average teams (Golden State, Indiana) lost in the play-in tournament.
The track record, in my opinion, is fairly strong: over the past four seasons, over 50% of the top-8 seeds in each conference have been above average in rim defense and the heavy majority of those teams make the postseason. The Dallas Mavericks are an interesting case study individually: they made the postseason in 2020-21 (finishing 11th in rim defense), made it in 2021-22 despite barely missing the top-15 (finished 17th), and missed the postseason last year when they finished 23rd. Rim defense isn’t a perfect metric nor is it a good indicator of postseason success (for reference, last year’s Finals participants finished 30th and 27th in rim defense). However, it is highly correlated to postseason appearances.
This season, the Mavericks rim defense has been bad; Dallas ranks 27th in rim defense and is allowing opponents to shoot 66.5% at the rim. However, opponents are only shooting 60.3% when guarded by Dereck Lively at the rim. Lively’s rim defense metrics compare favorably to players such as Onyeka Okongwu, Clint Capela, and ironically, Daniel Gafford. However, what is most concerning for Dallas are the non-Lively minutes; opponents are shooting significantly more frequently at the rim (5.7% higher rate per Cleaning the Glass) with Lively on the bench; by this metric, Lively’s rim deterrence versus his teammates is in the 98th percentile. As a result, it shouldn’t be a surprise why Dallas’ team performance is significantly better with a healthy Lively. The Mavericks have won 60% of games that Lively has played (despite only playing 26 minutes per night) and have a scoring differential of +9.2 in Lively’s minutes, a margin that would rank 2nd in the NBA. Dallas’ defense doesn’t magically become elite when Lively is on the court, but it does rise from well below average to average.
Why is all of this important? Well, because there perhaps isn’t a more similar player in the league to Lively than Daniel Gafford. In theory, by adding Gafford, the Mavericks can extrapolate Lively’s production and impact to 48 minutes, rather than 26, assuming both are healthy. Take a look at how similar both players are purely from a statistical standpoint this season:
| Rim Defense | Rim FG% | DREB% | Block% | P&R Finishing | |
| Dereck Lively II | 60.3% (-3.4% over expected) | 79% | 17.8% | 2.6% | 1.37 PPP |
| Daniel Gafford | 61.0% (-4.0% over expected) | 75% | 17.4% | 3.8% | 1.43 PPP |
Dallas acquired basically a mirror image of Lively; Gafford is five years older and has put up these numbers without having the benefit of playing with Luka Doncic. I’d argue Gafford is currently better than Lively as well; he’s a superior roller and one of the best shot blockers in the game, while also serving as an elite offensive rebounder. That isn’t a knock on Lively either, but rather, a compliment to how good Gafford is, particularly with his fit in Dallas.
With a healthy Lively this year, Dallas has been at a 49/50 win pace, which would be good for 5th place in the Western Conference (despite Lively not always playing with Doncic and Irving). Is it really that outlandish to envision, when fully healthy, the Mavericks to rock at say, a 52-win pace with the inclusion of Gafford? I truly don’t think so, simply because of Gafford’s ability to protect the rim and thrive as a screener and roller with Doncic. Come postseason time, we’ll reevaluate Gafford and Lively’s impact; recently, we’ve seen teams guard Lively with a wing to switch any screening action with Doncic, which has neutralized his offensive game and roll ability. Gafford will likely have the same schemes against him and challenges. In the postseason, those matchup choices will become more and more prominent. It’s why the Gafford deal to me isn’t for title contention upside, but rather, a regular season floor raiser who will elevate Dallas a tier. With Gafford, they’re much closer to the top-4 seeds in the West rather than the Play-In group.
One thing that has become abundantly clear in Nico Harrison’s tenure as general manager? He is not afraid to be aggressive; Harrison has now made impact deals in all three of his trade deadlines and, since taking over, has traded three first round picks and two pick swaps.
As a result of Harrison’s dealing, particularly with future first round draft picks, it seems like he has caught a bit of scrutiny amongst media pundits and analysts. Essentially, there seems to be a consensus school of thought that has begun to emerge: Dallas improved at the deadline but did so at such a steep cost that they have no hedge or “soft landing” if Luka Doncic were to leave. I’d argue this notion almost indicates that the Mavericks improved in a reckless manner, trading draft picks for upgrades that still leave the Mavericks far short of title contention.
Any insinuation that Dallas operated recklessly at the trade deadline stems from, in my opinion, a false premise. The Mavericks could have had three first round picks available for trade if they had waited to this summer; it seems like the counterargument to Dallas trading picks now is that additional assets would have been available this summer and, as such, the Mavericks could’ve landed a better player than Washington (in particular). That, however, is at odds with the reality of the NBA environment at large. Even armed with three first round picks, Dallas still would have been at a significant asset disadvantage compared to the NBA; the Knicks, Thunder, Jazz, Rockets, and Nets all have a war chest of draft assets while teams such as Sacramento, Miami, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Orlando, Golden State, and the Los Angeles Lakers would have all been on either equal (in the case of the Lakers) or better positioning than Dallas. There is no scenario where the Mavericks would be able to outbid the competition for a player people would universally agree was a tier-raising player. Regardless of when it occurred, Dallas would always be forced to cash in their draft capital on some player(s) that come with more questions than answers: are they worth a first round pick, can they contribute to winning, can they stay healthy, is their salary too prohibitive? Dallas’ move for Washington in particular nearly fits the prototype perfectly. We should not confuse the Mavericks’ aggressiveness in beginning to cash in those picks with recklessness; their asset situation, relative to competition, meant a trade like this would eventually come. Making that deal now, with 2.5 years remaining of Kyrie Irving’s contract and for a 25-year-old in P.J. Washington, feels like one of the better trades they could have made around the league. It’s hard to fault Harrison for capitalizing on that deal today, while offloading Grant Williams, then waiting for a more crowded trade market to take place this summer and squeeze Dallas out altogether.
One angle that criticism has come from around Dallas’ operations is how they don’t own any of their draft picks from 2027-2030, years where Luka Doncic isn’t under contract. To me, this is another indication that a league-wide assessment of the Mavericks’ roster building deems it reckless when, in my opinion, it’s more aggressive. The Mavericks have had to dip into those picks to remedy past mistakes (i.e. Kyrie Irving to replace Brunson, the 2027 first to replace Grant Williams, who cost a 2030 swap). The correct debate around Dallas’ team building strategy shouldn’t be around their current way of working, but rather, their previous asset management that has put them in this position. This game of Tetris that Harrison has had to play is the direct result of an imperfect roster, but also isn’t a novel concept to the Mavericks. The Phoenix Suns’ asset chest is significantly more depleted than Dallas’, they are anchored by three players (two of whom have serious availability concerns) and have minimal untapped potential or youth on their roster. The Los Angeles Lakers’ asset situation was nearly identical to Dallas’ prior to the Mavericks’ deadline deals, except their star player is 39 and could hit free agency this summer.
Any suggestion that the Mavericks should have held onto their draft picks for a more obvious third option behind Doncic / Irving or as a hedge against Doncic’s potential departure is at odds with the landscape and nature of the NBA. Over the past decade, only six players have led teams to titles: LeBron James, Stephen Curry, Kevin Durant, Kawhi Leonard, Giannis Antetokounmpo, and Nikola Jokic. Doncic is clearly in that same tier and the cost of doing business with a player of his caliber is being extremely aggressive and not saving assets for a soft landing in case Doncic departs. The NBA operates in a fundamentally different way than that of a Fortune 500 Company. No C-level risk officer would sign off on NBA franchises’ plans to invest so heavily in one area (superstar player) without hedging in other industries (aka keeping future picks). The NBA isn’t corporate America however, and superstars aren’t uncertain asset valuations. MVP, generational-level talent is what wins titles in the NBA and it’s a tale as true as time; teams should be investing as much as possible in that talent and not hedging on worst case scenarios. In fact, I’d argue that Dallas would have been reckless if they elected to hold onto future picks as a hedge, rather than invest heavily in Luka Doncic. Given where Dallas currently stands, it’s a false choice to say the Mavericks can hold their picks as a hedge / to be patient for a more obvious third option while still competing for a title. Moves like the deal for Washington eventually were going to happen.
The last thirty games in Dallas’ season will certainly be exciting and the good vibes are returning to the team amidst a three-game winning streak where they stabilized the ship. This is a roster full of versatile talent; Jason Kidd has a tall task to be able to push the right buttons to maximize the group’s potential (something I am highly skeptical of). Assuming the Mavericks get Dereck Lively and Dante Exum back from injury post-All-Star Break and assuming Dallas finishes their pre-All-Star schedule 2-1, the Mavericks could go into the home stretch 31-24, perhaps 1/1.5 games back of the 5th seed, with a fully healthy roster for the first time all season. That is something to be excited about.
This wasn’t a perfect deadline for the Mavericks and while I was critical of those who characterized Dallas’ maneuvering as reckless, I do think it’s a worthwhile question of whether or not Washington and Gafford can elevate Dallas enough to justify the cost of a first round pick and a pick swap. The evidence shows that doing the “Texas Two-Step”, with Gafford elevating Dallas’ regular season ceiling with his two-way rim ability, and Washington taking the “Aaron Gordon / Andrew Wiggins” step gets Dallas to title contention. The feasibility of it? I wouldn’t say Washington’s leap is the likeliest scenario, but it’s far from an impossibility. Regardless, I feel confident in saying Dallas’ floor has been raised by a substantial enough margin that getting into the playoffs feels likely. And, with the top tier talent they possess, that sure is a place where they can do some damage.
The Chirp 